Fixed nonideological attributes and government survival Model 3 4 0. The article compares three successful and one failed attempt by the president to unseat the prime minister in Ukraine under a premier-presidential system. Stable government, when based upon less correspondence between party representation in parliament and party representation in government, may have come at a price for overall representative of democracy. Unfortunately, this justification is not valid. Materialist-postmaterialist party scales can be constructed from these sources by taking the mean score of each party's supporters on the index as an indicator of that party' s position. A hypothetical example will make this clear. The general opinion among macroeconomists is that coalitional systems produce policymakers who tend to act too little and too late due to political fragmentation and conflict among the coalition parties.
Government survival is important because it constitutes an essential component of the overall functioning of parliamentary democracies. There is clearly unfulfilled potential to merge these two research traditions into a single more comprehensive account of government termination. The dual executive of a semi-presidential system mixes a transactional executive-legislative relationship with a hierarchical one. Germany and Austria from 1927 to 1938 or the collapse of the polity. The rate of unemployment plays an important role in how the voters evaluate the incumbents, since each extra percentage point of unemployment translates into additional loss for the incumbents. When scholars first asserted the essential connection between parties and democracy, most of the world's democracies were parliamentary. Dodd 1976 demonstrated that duration increases as governments approach the minimal winning condition.
Given the linkage between hazard rates and duration values, the specification of a baseline hazard is equivalent to specifying an underlying distribution for the duration values; in this sense it is akin to specifying the distribution of the disturbance term in regression analysis. It has been well established in the political science literature that left—right ideology adequately captures the existing cleavage structure in Western democracies Blais et al. Drawing on the party mandate literature, we conduct a quantitative text analysis of election manifestos that yields a dataset containing over 1,100 pledges. Polish semi-presidentialism evolved from a pacted transition between the leadership of the communist regime and the Solidarity opposition movement. Nevertheless, that new consideration turned out to have immense implications for future research. Although the system itself is polarized, governments might be long-lived provided the blocs themselves are reasonably homogeneous on policy matters. Por este motivo, analizaremos comparativamente los casos del Frente Popular 1936-1941 , la Unidad Popular 1969-1973 y la Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia 1988-2010 , cada una de las cuales constituye una experiencia con características diversas, situadas en coyunturas particulares, pero que, sin embargo, se enlazan entre sí por constituir coaliciones de partidos de izquierda que han evolucionado desde una alianza electoral a una coalición de gobierno.
Findings show that single party governments have performed better than the coalition governments and the period of transition to the open economy is the most successful above all. For decades theorizing about party competition in two-party and multiparty democracies has proceeded along separate tracks. This is a very different hypothesis from the ideological diversity hypothesis, but it, too, has received little empirical investigation. The focus of that interpretation is on the difficulties that party systems with a strong extremist or antisystem presence tend to experience in putting together ideologically coherent or workable coalition governments. Basic attributes and government survival 37 Model 1 reveals a set of findings that conform very closely to what one would expect: majority governments and postelection governments tend to be associated with lower termination rates and hence longer durations, while caretaker governments and governments with higher effective numbers of member parties imply higher hazards or shorter durations. This effect is not apparent in every system, but it must be borne in mind that the model specification is incomplete.
There were, in addition, the very successes of West Germany in transforming cultural values Conradt 1980 and of France in institutional engineering to get around them to be reckoned with; neither is particularly compatible with a strong interpretation of the constraining role of culture. This exclusion principally concerned governments that took office sometime after the beginning of a parliamentary term and ended with the arrival of the next regularly scheduled elections; the rationale was that it is impossible to say how long these governments would have lasted if the requirement of new elections had not forced their end. If so, however, it is not obvious that instability should be the result, since it could be argued that the very difficulty in forming viable coalitions would tend to oblige government parties to stick with the existing coalition. The quantitative study of government survival 27 Government duration. We argue that grand coalitions differ from the more typical senior—junior partners in terms of the ability of individual parties to respond to their constituencies. We illustrate the utility of this update by providing a variety of means of conceptualizing government stability. This justification can be assessed with the aid of Figure 2.
The payoff comes in the substantive work you can do with the new models you will learn but which you cannot do with any regression model. Needless to say, comparisons between the two have long been a stock-in-trade of political analysts and propagandists. Institutional arrangements, including the effective number of parties in government and the type of government, combine with economic performance to affect the survival rates of postcommunist governments. Parliamentary democracy is a particular delegation regime, a way to structure the democratic policy process, and an attempt to solve agency problems. In this subsection, we consider whether rates of termination vary significantly with the leftward or rightward position of governments.
Choices in such matters as which terminations to censor, how broadly to define government membership, and whether to count unaccepted resignations must also be factored into the picture. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. The data set that I created for this study ultimately included, in its largest form, well over 1,200 variables. This article aims to identify the conditions that are associated with the onset of cohabitation. Thirdly, I examine external validity by comparing different scales in relation to various political variables. Nevertheless, caretaker governments that have no identifiable party composition cannot be evaluated on attributes such as majority status and therefore become excluded from the analysis because of missing data.
Because antisystem parties are usually considered unacceptable as coalition partners, governing majorities must be formed from the remaining prosystem parties. In this model the prime minister has proposal power over cabinet appointments and the president an expost veto. The plot for one such system - France majority cases - is also shown in Figure 6. The results of these tests will inform the conclusions concerning government survival in parliamentary regimes that I offer - at least tentatively - in Chapter 8. If cabinet heterogeneity is not managed properly, this may in turn slow down decision processes.